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Legality, Standing and Substantive
Review in Community Law
PAUL CRAIG*
1 Introduction
The circumstances in which an individual can seek the annulment of an act in
Community law is a topic which has generated a significant amount of comment
within the literature. This literature has sought to analyse the relevant case law
of the European Court of Justice, and to consider the policy reasons which may
have underpinned the Court's reasoning within this area. The variety of opinion
which has been proffered will be considered in due course.
The present article is aimed at contributing to this debate and has three
objectives. The first is to analyse the actual reasoning used by the ECJ in the
seminal cases on standing within Article 173. It will be argued that this reasoning
has not been fully understood, and that this is a prerequisite for further analysis
of the policy reasons which have informed the Court's approach. The second
objective is to consider the nature of the policy arguments which may have
influenced the ECJ's jurisprudence in this area. It will be contended that
insufficient attention has been given to the type of subject matter which has
been at stake in the leading cases, and that once the nature of this subject matter
is appreciated the reluctance of the Court to become embroiled in frequent
review actions can be more readily understood. The third of the objectives is
aimed at drawing closer links between the Court's approach towards standing,
and the standard of substantive review. The latter issue is concerned with the
extent to which the Court is willing to accept the decisions made by the
Commission and the Council, and the intensity of review which it brings to bear
on such matters. It will be argued that there is a thematic connection between
the issues of standing and the scope of substantive review which has not been
sufficiently noted, and that the realization of this connection can improve our
understanding of both topics.
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2 Article 173: Standing for Non-Privileged Applicants
A Critical Analysis
As is well known, Article 173(2) clearly does not give non-privileged applicants
unfettered access to the ECJ. Review proceedings can only be brought in three
types of case. The first is straightforward, and is the situation where there is a
decision addressed to the applicant. In these circumstances the addressee can
challenge the decision before the EGJ. The second situation is that in which
there is a decision addressed to another person, and the applicant claims that it
is of direct and individual concern to him or her. The third type of case which
can arise is that where there is a decision in the form of a regulation, and the
applicant claims that it is of direct and individual concern to him or her. Not
surprisingly, litigation has been primarily concerned with categories two and
three, and it is these which will be considered in turn.
(a) Decisions Addressed to Another Person
The seminal case on this type of situation is the decision in Plaumann.' In 1961
the German Government requested the Commission to authorize it to suspend
the collection of duties on clementines imported from third countries. The
Commission refused the request, and addressed its answer to the German
Government. The applicant in the case was an importer of clementines, who
sought to contest the legality of the Commission's decision. The Court stated
that the relevant wording within Article 173(2) justified the 'broadest inter-
pretation', and that the provisions of the Treaty regarding the right of interested
parties to bring an action must not 'be interpreted restrictively'.2 It then adopted
the following test to determine whether the applicant was individually concerned
by the decision addressed to the German Government.3 It is useful to set out
the test in full.
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be
individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes
which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated
from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually
just as in the case of the person addressed. In the present case the applicant is affected
by the disputed Decision as an importer of clementines, that is to say, by reason of a
commercial activity which may at any time be practised by any person and is not
therefore such as to distinguish the applicant in relation to the contested Decision as
in the case of the addressee.
The test in the Plaumann case has been cited in many later cases where an
applicant has sought to challenge a decision which has been formally addressed
1 Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95; [1964] CMLR 29. After the TEU, Article 173(2)
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to another. Some of these will be considered below. Because the test has proved
to be of such importance, it is worth dwelling a little on the essence of the test
itself and its application to the facts of the case. By doing so one can understand
why private applicants have found it so difficult to succeed under the Plaumann
formula. The preceding quotation from Plaumann can be neatly divided into
two parts, the test itself and the application of the test to the facts of the case.
The test itself is encompassed by the first sentence within the paragraph. This
serves to emphasize that the applicants who claim to be individually concerned
by a decision addressed to another can only do so if they are in some way
differentiated from all other persons, and by reason of these distinguishing
features singled out in the same way as the initial addressee. The test does,
however, recognize that it is perfectly possible for there to be more than one
applicant who is individually concerned in the above sense. The application of
the test to the facts of the case is contained in the second sentence of the quotation:
the applicant in the instant case failed because he practised a commercial activity
which could be carried on by any person. The reason for rejecting the claim can
be criticized on both pragmatic and conceptual grounds.
In pragmatic terms the application of the test can be criticized as being
economically unrealistic. If there are, for example, only a very limited number
of firms pursuing a certain trade this is not fortuitous, nor is the number of
those firms likely to rise overnight. The presently existing range of such firms is
established by the ordinary principles of supply and demand: if there are two or
three firms in the industry this is because they can satisfy the current market
demand. Even if there should be a sudden surge of desire for clementines, the
result will normally be that the existing firms will import more of the produce.
The argument that the activity of importing clementines can be undertaken by
any person, and that therefore the applicant is not individually concerned, is
thus unconvincing.
The reasoning of the ECJ is also open to criticism in conceptual terms. Put
shortly, the reasoning of the Court renders it literally impossible for an applicant
ever to succeed, except in a very limited category of retrospective cases. This
can be demonstrated as follows. The test in the first sentence of the quotation
has to be applied at some point in time. There are only three choices. One could
ask the relevant question at the time that the determination being challenged
was made; one could pose that test at the time of the challenge itself; or one
could pose the test at some future, undefined date. Intuitively one would imagine
that choices one or two would represent the most appropriate juncture at which
to ask the question contained in the first sentence of the Plaumann case: was
the applicant singled out in the requisite manner at one of these dates. In actual
fact the ECJ applied choice three: the applicant failed because the activity of
clementine importing could be carried out by anyone at any time. On this
reasoning the applicant would fail even if there were only one such importer at
the time the challenged decision was made, since it would always be open to
the Court to contend that others could enter the industry. On this reasoning no
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applicant could ever succeed, subject to the caveat considered below, since it
could always be argued that others might engage in the trade at some juncture.
On this reasoning the 'possibility' of locus standi for an applicant would be like
a mirage in the desert, ever receding and never capable of being grasped. Even
if our sole trader were to return to the Court and protest that it was still the
only firm affected by the decision, it would still be greeted by the invocation of
the same reasoning as on its first foray into the judicial arena. It would still be
argued that it had not demonstrated the necessary individuality because others
might engage in the activity in question.4 As Advocate-General Roemer stated
in the Eridania case, it must be mistaken to take such account of the future
effect of a decision, since otherwise it would never be possible to claim individual
concern in relation to a measure which had a permanent effect, even though at
the time it was made the decision only affected one firm.'
The argument advanced in the previous paragraph might be opposed by
contending that the applicant in the Plaumann case was properly rejected since
it was a member of an open rather than closed category of applicants, and hence
was not individually concerned. Thus Hartley remarks that since anyone can
import fruit, and the measure would apply to anyone who commenced operations
after the decision came into effect, the category was an open one and the
applicant was not individually concerned by it.6 Open categories are regarded
as those in which the membership is not fixed at the time of the decision; a
closed category is one in which it is thus fixed. This reasoning, however, does
not serve to dispel the concerns expressed above. Quite the contrary, it reinforces
those concerns. There are two problems with this reasoning.
On the one hand, in practical terms, the language of open categories is
employed to rule out standing for any applicant, even if there is only a very
limited number presently engaged in that trade, on the ground that others might
undertake the trade thereafter. If the presence of such notional, future traders
is to render the category open, and not determinate at the date when the decision
comes into force, then as indicated previously, this ignores the practical economics
which determine the number of those who supply a particular commodity.
On the other hand, in conceptual terms, the sense in which a category is said
to be open at the time of the contested decision is questionable. To regard any
category as open merely because others might notionally undertake the trade in
issue is not self evident. The first half of the Plaumann quotation, which contains
the test itself, is based on the assumption that some people have attributes which
distinguish them from others, and that they possess these attributes at the time
the contested decision is made. The fact that others might acquire these attributes
later, by joining that trade, does not, of course, mean that they are presently part
4 In reality such repeated forays would not be possible since there would be time limit problems.
5 Cases 10 and 18168, Societa Eridania' Zucche-fici Nazionali v Commission 11969] ECR 459, 492. Advocate
General Roemer did not believe that the Plaumann test intended to limit applicants in this manner, but it is
difficult to read the application of the test in the Plaumann case itself and in later cases in any other way.
6 T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law (2nd ed, 1988), 344-5.
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of the same category as those who already do work in that sphere, let alone that
somehow they are to be regarded retrospectively as part of the limited group
which initially operated in that area.
A brief consideration of later cases will serve to demonstrate the restrictive
nature of the Plaumann test. In Glucoseries Reunies7 the applicant was a Belgian
company which sought the annulment of a Commission decision authorizing
the French Government to levy a duty on imports into France of glucose for a
year. The applicant argued that it was the only producer of glucose in Belgium
which was in a position to export goods from that country into France, that the
total number of glucose producers in the whole Community which would be
affected by the decision was only about twelve, and that this position was unlikely
to change during the period of the contested decision because of the difficulty
of establishing commercial production of the product. The Court none the
less rejected the application, and denied standing, relying on the Plaumann
formula.'
More recent applicants have not fared better. In Piraiki-Petraiki9 the applicants
were seven Greek cotton undertakings who sought to challenge a decision
authorizing the French Government to impose a quota system on imports into
France of yam from Greece between November 1981 and January 1982. Some
of the undertakings had already entered into contracts to export cotton yam to
France, which were to be fulfilled during the quota period and which were for
amounts of yarn in excess of that allowed by the quota. The Court quoted the
test from the Plaumann case. The applicants argued that they fulfilled the
conditions set out above since they were the main Greek undertakings which
produced and exported cotton yam to France. They contended that they therefore
belonged to a class of traders which were individually identifiable on the basis
of criteria having to do with the product in question, the business activities
carried on and the length of time during which they have been carried on. They
further sought to counter the Plaumann type argument, that the activity was one
which could be carried on at any time by any person, by emphasizing that the,
production and export to France of cotton yam of Greek origin required an
industrial and commercial organization which could not be established from one
day to the next, and certainly not during the short period of application of the
decision in question.1" The Court responded as follows."
That proposition cannot be accepted. It must first be pointed out that the applicants
are affected by the decision at issue only in their capacity as exporters to France of
cotton yam of Greek origin. The decision is not intended to limit the production of
those products in any way, nor does it have such a result.
7 Case 1/64, Glucoseries Reunies v Commsion [1964] CMLR 596.
8 See also, Case 38/64, Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v Commission [1965] CMLR 276; Case 97/85, Deutsche
Lebensmitedwerke v Commission [19871 ECR 2265, 2286-7; Case 34/88, Cevap v Council [1988] ECR 6265, 6270;
Case 191/88, Co-Frutta SARL v Commission [1989] ECR 793, 798.
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As for the exportation of those products to France, that is clearly a commercial activity
which can be carried on at any time by any undertaking whatever. It follows that the
decision at issue concerns the applicants in the same way as any other trader actually
or potentially finding himself in the same position. The mere fact that the applicants
export goods to France is not therefore sufficient to establish that they are individually
concerned by the contested decision.
As will be seen below, certain of the applicants were given standing, but
notwithstanding this fact the decision in the Piraiki-Patraiki case provides a
fitting example of the difficulties which applicants face in this area. The applicants
contended that they should be regarded as individually concerned, being those
firms which would be affected by the quota introduced by the contested decision.
Their arguments, to the effect that they were a limited group, and that it was
not realistic that their number could plausibly be increased within the relevant
time period, were forceful.
In the preceding discussion it was indicated that applicants had been successful
in one type of case. The type of case is that in which the decision concerns a
completed set of past events. The Toepfer decision provides a well known example
of this.12 The applicants were dealers in grain who applied for import licences
from the German authorities on 1 October 1963. On that date the levy for the
relevant imports was zero. Because of changes in market conditions the German
authorities realized that the dealers would make large profits, and therefore
rejected their applications until the levy had been increased. The importers were
told that their applications would be rejected, and the Commission was asked
to confirm this decision. The Commission then raised the levy from 2 October,
and on 3 October confirmed the ban with regard to the period from 1-4 October
inclusive. The dealers sought to have this decision annulled. They were accorded
standing. The Court reasoned that the only persons who were affected by the
contested measures were importers who had applied for an import licence during
the course of I October 1963. The number and identity of these importers had
'already become fixed and ascertainable before 4 October when the challenged
decision was made. For this reason the applicants were deemed to be individually
concerned. A similar theme can be perceived in part of the reasoning in the
Piraiki-Petraiki case. In that case some of the applicants had made contracts to
supply cotton yarn to French buyers prior to the contested decision, which
contracts were to be performed during the period covered by the decision. These
contracts covered quantities of yarn which were in excess of the quotas set by
the Commission decision. The contracts could not, therefore, be carried out,
and the affected applicants claimed that this meant that they were individually
concerned. This argument was accepted by the Court.13
12 Cases 106 and 107/63, A/fred Toepfer and Getreide-Import Gesellschafi v Commission [1965] ECR 405; [1966]
CMIR 111.
13 Above n 9, 244.
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(b) Decisions in the Form of Regulations
The other type of case which has proven to be problematic is that in which an
individual asserts that although the challenged measure is in the form of a
regulation, it is in reality a decision which is of direct and individual concern to
him or her. Applications of this type have not proven to be notably successful,
and the EGJ has not always adopted the same approach to the issue. Two tests
can be identified in the case law on this topic: the closed category test, and the
abstract terminology test. As will be seen, the latter is, in essence, stricter than
the former, and it is this latter test which has been applied more recently by the
Court. Let us, however, begin with an example of the closed category approach.
The CAM case provides a fitting example. 4 The applicant had obtained on
19 July 1964 an export licence for a certain quantity of barley. Community
regulations provided for the payment of export refunds on certain products,
including barley. These refunds could either be determined on the day of
exportation, or they could be fixed in advance on the day on which the application
for an export licence was lodged. However, if the latter course was adopted,
then certain modifications in the refund could be made, to take account of the
threshold price which was applicable in the month of export. The threshold
price for barley was increased in October 1974, and this would have had the
effect of increasing the refund to which CAM was entitled. The Commission,
however, passed Regulation 2546/74, which in effect denied the benefit of this
increase in the refund to those who had applied for an export licence prior to
7 October 1974. CAM sought to annul this regulation. The arguments of the
respective parties can be predicted: the Commission contended that the claim
should be rejected since the measure was a regulation; the applicant argued that
the measure was in reality a decision which was of individual concern to it. The
Court found for the applicants on the standing issue. The contested regulation
concerned a fixed and known number of cereal exporters, and also the amount
of the transactions for which the advance fixing had been requested was also
known. Moreover, the determinacy of the group was further clarified by the fact
that the refund system was abolished from 26 July 1974, and therefore the
category of traders who were affected was limited to those who had sought
advance fixing before that date and who still had current export licences on
7 October 1974. Because of these factors the Court was willing to find that the
applicants were individually concerned, even though the measure had a legislative
function.'5
The approach which is prevalent in the more recent jurisprudence of the ECJ
is, however, the abstract terminology test. This is exemplified in the Calpak
14 Case 100/74, SociNt/ CAM SA v Commission [1975] ECR 1393. See also, Cases 41-44/70, International Fruit
Company v Commission [1971] ECR 411.
15 [1975] ECR 1393, 1402-3.
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case.' 6 The applicants were producers of Williams pears, and they complained
that the calculation of production aid granted to them was void. Under the
terms of an earlier regulation, production aid was to be calculated on the basis
of the average production over the previous three years, in order to avoid the
risk of over production. The applicants alleged that the Commission had in fact
abandoned this method of assessing aid, and had based their aid calculation on
one marketing year, in which production was atypically low. The applicants also
claimed that they were a closed and definable group, the members of which
were known to, or identifiable by, the Commission.
The Court began its analysis by noting the important point of principle which
underpins this part of Article 173(2). It recognized that the rationale for allowing
any challenge to provisions which were in the form of regulations was to prevent
the Community institutions from immunizing measures from attack merely by
the form in which they were expressed. Thus, if regulations as such could never
be challenged by individuals then it would be possible for the Commission and
Council to prevent annulment actions by non-privileged applicants by always
casting their measures in this form. It was for this reason that the possibility of
challenging measures cast in the form of regulations was included in the Treaty.
The task of the Court was to look behind the form of the act, in order to
determine whether by its nature or substance it really was a regulation as opposed
to a disguised decision which was of individual concern to the applicant.17
The Court then proceeded to lay down the test which was to be used for
distinguishing between real regulations, and those which were regulations in
form rather than substance. It stated that Article 189 was to be the benchmark
in this respect: was the measure of general application or not? If it was then it
would be deemed to be a real regulation. The Court then expanded upon this
definition and developed the abstract terminology test.'8
A provision which limits the granting of production aid for all producers in respect of
a particular product to a uniform percentage of the quantity produced by them during
a uniform period is by nature a measure of general application within the meaning of
Article 189 of the Treaty. In fact the measure applies to objectively determined
situations and produces legal effects with regard to categories of persons described in
a generalized and abstract manner. The nature of the measure as a regulation is not
called in question by the mere fact that it is possible to determine the number or even
identity of the producers to be granted the aid which is limited thereby.
Applying this criterion to the facts of the case, the Court found that the
contested measure was a true regulation. The fact that the choice of reference
period was particularly important for the applicants, whose production was
subject to considerable variation from one marketing year to another as a result
16 Cases 789 and 790/79, Calpak SpA and Societa Emiliana Lavorazione Fruna SpA v Commission [1980] ECR
1949; [1981] 1 CM.R 26. See also, Cases 103-9/78, Beauport v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 17; Case
162/78, Wagner v Commission [1979] ECR 3467.
17 Calpak [1980] ECR 1949, 1961.
18 Loc cit.
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of their own programme of production, was not sufficient to entitle them to an
individual remedy.
The same approach is evident in other cases, such as Moksel.19 The Court
reiterated the holding that the nature of a measure as a regulation is not called
into question by the fact that it may be possible to determine the number or
even identity of the traders who were concerned by it. It also expanded on the
positive aspect of the definition of a regulation, stating that it must be deduced
from the purpose, framework and nature of the measure whether it was indeed
a regulation which was of general application.2"
With the exception of the cases which will be considered below, the abstract
terminology test has not proven easy for applicants to satisfy. The test places
those who wish to challenge an act which is in the form of a regulation in a
difficult position. The nature of this difficulty can be presented as follows.
The purpose of allowing any challenges to acts which are in the form of
regulations is, as the ECJ made clear in the Calpak case, to prevent the
Community institutions from immunizing matters from attack by the form of
their classification. Thus, if regulations were never open to challenge the in-
stitutions could classify matters in this way, safe in the knowledge that they
could never be annulled by private individuals. Article 173(2) seeks to prevent
this from happening by permitting a challenge when the regulation is in reality
a decision which is of direct and individual concern to the applicant. As the ECJ
made clear in the Calpak case, this requires the Court to look behind the form
of the measure, in order to determine whether in substance it really is a regulation
or not.
The problem with the abstract terminology test is that rather than looking
behind form to substance, it comes perilously close to looking behind form to
form. The reason resides in the nature of the test. A regulation will be accepted
as a true regulation if it applies to 'objectively determined situations and produces
legal effects with regard to categories of persons described in a generalized and
abstract manner'. However, it is always possible to draft norms in this manner,
and thus to immunize them from attack, more especially as the Court makes
clear that knowledge of the number or identity of those affected will not prevent
the norm from being regarded as a true regulation. If the Commission wishes,
therefore, to ensure that its measures are rendered safe from challenge under
Article 173(2), it can frame them as regulations drafted in the abstract and
generalized manner described above. Now it is true that the Court expanded on
the abstract terminology test in Moksel, and made reference to the purpose of
the challenged norm, as well as the framework within which it was made, as
factors which were of relevance in determining whether the measure was a real
regulation or not. These criteria could be used to look behind the form of a
measure to its substance. They can, however, also be utilized to reinforce the
'9 Case 45181, Alexander Moksel Import-Export GmbH & Co HanddsKG v Commission [1982] ECR 1129.20 Ibid 1144-5.
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conclusions reached from the language in which the measure is expressed: if the
contested norm is expressed in abstract and generalized norm creating language,
this in itself creates the assumption that the purpose of the measure is to regulate
a general sphere of activity.
The reasons why the Court has been restrictive in its construction of Article
173(2) has been the subject of academic discussion which will be considered
below. Before doing so, it is necessary to consider certain types of case in which
the ECJ has adopted a more liberal attitude to standing by private parties.
3 Article 173: Standing for Non-Privileged
Applicants-The More Liberal Case Law
The ECJ has been more liberal in according standing in four main types of case.
These cases will be examined, and this examination will be followed by an
analysis of the policy reasons which have informed the Court's jurisprudence in
these areas and in the 'mainline' cases considered in the previous section.
(a) Dumping Cases
One of the areas in which the Court has been more liberal is in the context of
dumping. The Community has passed dumping regulations, with the object of
preventing those outside the Community from selling goods within the Com-
munity at too low a price, to the detriment of traders within the EC. The
Community response is to impose an anti-dumping duty on the firm or firms in
question. Whether a firm is in fact dumping, and the consequential issues
concerns the calculation of its 'normal' production costs and prices of sale, are
often very controversial.
Three types of applicant may wish to challenge an anti-dumping duty: the
firm which initiated the complaint about dumping, the producers of the product
which is subject to the anti-dumping duty, and the importers of the product on
which the duty is imposed. In deciding whether to accord standing to such
applicants the Court is placed in a difficult position since, as will be seen below,
dumping duties must be imposed by regulation, as opposed to decision. If,
therefore, the Court holds that the regulation is not in fact a regulation at all,
then it is arguable that the Commission had no power to impose the measure;
if, however, the Court holds, without more, that it is a true regulation, then this
may preclude any challenge by any applicant. This conundrum serves to explain
the reasoning of the ECJ in the cases examined below, in which it formally
recognizes the measure as a regulation, but then seeks to determine whether the
applicant is individually concerned by it.
The Timex case provides an example of the first category of applicant: a
company which initiated the complaint, but was unhappy with the resultant
regulation.2' The Community had imposed, through the form of a regulation,
21 Case 264182, 2"mex Corporation v Council and Commission [1985] ECR 849; [1985] 3 CMLR 550.
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an anti-dumping duty on watches from the USSR. It had done so at the
instigation of Timex, which had initiated the proceedings, and the duty had
explicitly stated that it had taken account of the injury caused to Timex by the
dumped imports. However, Timex sought to challenge the regulation, arguing
that the duty was too low, and thus that it was still being injured by the imports.
An initial issue was whether Timex had standing to challenge the regulation. The
Council and Commission argued that Timex was not named in the regulation, and
that it was not individually concerned by it, since it affected all watch makers
in the Community alike. Timex argued by way of response that the regulation
was in reality a decision which was of individual concern to it, since it had
initiated the proceedings, and since the duty was fixed with reference to its
economic situation.
The Court found that the applicant did have standing. In reaching this
conclusion it was influenced by the fact that anti-dumping duties must be
imposed by regulation; that Timex had initiated the original procedure; that the
contested duty had been made with reference to Timex's situation; and that it
was the leading manufacturer in the Community which was affected by the
dumped goods. In reaching this conclusion the Court recognized that the
challenged measure was of a legislative nature, but stated that it could, none the
less, be of individual concern to certain traders.22
In the Timex case it was the complainant who was accorded standing in order
to challenge the level of the anti-dumping duty. The Allied case indicates the
Court's approach when the applicant is the exporter affected by the relevant
duty.23 Representatives of the European fertilizer industry had complained to
the Commission about the import of fertilizer from the United States of America.
This led to the imposition of an anti-dumping duty on the relevant products.
The applicant companies, who were affected by the regulation, agreed to raise
their prices in 1981, but withdrew these undertakings in 1982. The Commission,
therefore, reimposed an anti-dumping duty on the products, and it was this
regulation which was challenged by the applicants.
The exporters were afforded standing by the ECJ. In reaching this conclusion
the Court stressed, in addition to the type of factors considered above, the fact
that standing should be granted to those producers or exporters who were either
identified in the measures or were concerned by the preliminary investigations.
Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that anti-dumping duties can only
be imposed after investigations concerning the production and exporting prices
of undertakings which have been individually identified.24
There is, as stated above, a third category of applicant who may wish to
contest the legality of an anti-dumping regulation: this is the importer of the
product against which the anti-dumping duty has been imposed. The position
22 Ibid 566. CfMoksd [1982] ECR 1129, 1144, 'A single provision cannot at one and the same time have the
character of a measure of general application and of an individual measure'.
23 Cases 239/82 and 275/82, Allied Corporation v Commission [1984] ECR 1005; [1985] 3 CMLR 572.
24 Ibid 613.
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would appear to be as follows. The mere fact that the importer is an agent for
one of the companies affected by the regulation is insufficient. Such an importer
must be referred to in the contested measures, in the sense of, for example, the
level of the duty being established partly by reference to the resale prices charged
by the importer; or the importer may qualify as individually concerned if other
matters single it out, such as the fact that it is the most important importer of
the product and the ultimate consumer thereof." In rejecting applications by
importers under Article 173 in circumstances other than these, the ECJ has been
influenced by the fact that importers can make use of Article 177 as a method
of contesting a regulation. They are able to raise their objections in a legal action
brought against the agency which collects the duty, and the national court can
then refer the matter to the ECJ.
(b) Competition Cases
A second area in which the ECJ has been more liberal in its construction of the
criteria for standing concerns competition policy, which is regulated by Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty. Under Article 3(2) of Regulation 17/62, a Member
State, or any natural or legal person who claims to have a legitimate interest,
can make an application to the Commission, putting forward evidence of a
breach of Articles 85 and 86. The Commission is also empowered to investigate
matters of its own initiative.
The approach of the ECJ is exemplified by the Metro case.26 Metro argued
that the distribution system operated by SABA was in breach of Article 85 of
the Treaty. It initiated a complaint under Article 3(2) of Regulation 17/62. The
Commission decided that certain aspects of the distribution system were not in
fact in breach of Article 85, and it was this decision, addressed to SABA, that
Metro sought to annul. The question arose as to whether Metro could claim to
be individually concerned by a decision addressed to another.
Metro was accorded standing. Two factors were particularly important in
reaching this conclusion. On the one hand, Metro was the firm which was being
excluded from the SABA distribution system. On the other hand, it was also
the undertaking which had initiated the complaint under Article 3(2)(b) of
Regulation 17, which allowed private parties to bring such matters to the
Commission's attention.
The more liberal attitude of the Court in this case is apparent by contrasting
it to the approach which is evident in the case law interpreting the Plaumann
test. If the 'normal' interpretation of individual concern had been adopted then
Metro would almost certainly have failed. The decision addressed to SABA
would have been held to affect an open category: all those who were self-service
wholesalers and who wished to handle the products of SABA. Given the special
25 Allied, para 15; Case C-133187, Nashua Corporation v Commission and Council [1990] 2 CMLR 6; Case C-
358189, Extramet Industrie v Council [1991] ECR 1-2501; Case C-156/87, Gesetner Holdings v Council [1990] ECR
1-781; Cf Case C-323/88, Sermes SA v Directeur Des Services Des Douanes De Strasbourg [1992] 2 CMLR 632.
26 Case 26/76, Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1977] ECR 1875.
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circumstances of competition policy, the Court was, however, willing to accord
standing to Metro in the instant case.
(c) State Aid
The provision of state aid to industry is a matter regulated by the Treaty in
Articles 92-94. The principal objective is to prevent the conditions of competition
from being distorted, which would be the case if the firms in one state could
obtain aid or subsidies from their government. The Commission will investigate
instances of state aid in order to determine whether they are compatible with
the Treaty, and will address a decision to the relevant state. That state could
clearly challenge the decision under Article 173, but the Treaty is less clear on
whether a complainant could also do so. Such complainants are not afforded
the same recognition as they are in the context of competition proceedings, but
the ECJ has shown itself to be liberal in its construction of the standing criteria
in this area.
In COFAZ2 7 three French fertilizer companies complained to the Commission
that the Netherlands was granting a preferential tariff for the supply of natural
gas to its own Dutch producers of fertilizer. The Commission instituted an
investigation under Article 93(2), in which the applicant companies played a full
part. The Dutch Government then modified its pricing policy for gas, and the
Commission decided that the procedure under Article 93(2) could be halted.
The applicants disagreed and sought to have the decision of the Commission
annulled. Did they have standing to challenge it? The Court quoted the Plaumann
test, but stated that where the relevant provisions of the Treaty, or regulations
made pursuant thereto, allowed private parties to complain, or apprise the
Community institutions of a breach of those provisions, then such parties should
have standing to challenge the resultant decision made by the Community.2"
The Court relied explicitly on the analogy with the dumping and competition
cases.
(d) Reinforcing the Democratic Nature of the Community
The last type of case in which there is evidence of a more lenient approach to
standing concerns the institutional structure of the Community itself, and the
extent to which this can be perceived as a democratic community open to all
parties across the political spectrum. This is exemplified by the Greens case.29
The Parliament had made an allocation of funds to cover the costs incurred by
political parties who had participated in the 1984 European elections. The
manner of allocating the funds was biased towards those parties which had been
represented in Parliament before the election, and less favourable to those seeking
representation for the first time. The allocation was challenged by a party in
27 Case 169/84, Compagnie Franpaise De L'Azote (COFAZ) SA v Commission [1986] 3 CMLR 385.
28 Provided that the grant of the contested state aid would disadvantage the applicants on the relevant market.
29 Case 294/83, Parri Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339.
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this latter category. It was held that the party was individually concerned by
the contested decision. The reasoning of the EGJ is captured in the following
extract."
This action concerns a situation which has never before come before the Court.
Because they had representatives in the institution, certain political groupings took
part in the adoption of a decision which deals both with their own treatment and with
that accorded to rival groupings which were not represented. In view of this, and in
view of the fact that the contested measure concerns the allocation of public funds for
the purpose of preparing for elections and it is alleged that those funds were allocated
unequally, it cannot be considered that only groupings which were represented and
which were therefore identifiable at the date of the adoption of the contested measure
are individually concerned by it.
Such an interpretation would give rise to inequality in the protection afforded by the
Court to the various groupings competing in the same elections. Groupings not
represented could not prevent the allocation of the appropriations at issue before the
beginning of the election campaign because they would be unable to plead the illegality
of the basic decision except in support of an action against the individual decisions
refusing to reimburse sums greater than those provided for. It would therefore be
impossible for them to bring an action for annulment before the Court prior to the
decisions or to obtain an order from the Court under Article 185 of the Treaty
suspending application of the contested basic decision.
Consequently, it must be concluded that the applicant association, which was in
existence at the time when the 1982 Decision was adopted and which was able to
present candidates at the 1984 elections, is individually concerned by the contested
measures.
4 Article 173: Standing for Non-Privileged
Applicants-The Policy Arguments
It is apparent from the preceding analysis of the case law that applicants, other
than those who fall within the categories considered in the previous section,
have not readily been accorded standing under Article 173(2). Why the ECJ has
adopted a generally restrictive construction of standing is the issue which will
be addressed in this section. As will be seen, commentators have given differing
answers to this question. Any such answer must fulfil two conditions if it is to
be effective as an explanation of the ECJ's jurisprudence in this area.
On the one hand, it must furnish a convincing explanation as to why the
Court has been restrictive in the general run of cases.
30 Ibid 1368.
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On the other hand, it must provide an acceptable explanation for the Court's
greater willingness to allow standing in areas such as dumping, competition and
the like."'
In the discussion which follows no attempt will be made to survey every
possible explanation which has been proffered for the Court's approach. Certain
of these hypotheses have been adequately explored within the existing literature.32
The focus will, rather, be upon particular explanations for the ECJ's jurisprudence
which have gained a degree of acceptance within the literature. Analysis of these
arguments will be followed by the development of an alternative hypothesis
which, it will be argued, provides a more rounded rationale for the case law in
this area.
(a) The Appellate Court Argument
Rasmussen addresses the first of the questions outlined above. 3 He considers,
and rejects, a number of possible rationales for the Court's restrictive approach
under Article 173(2), some of which will be addressed below. Rasmussen then
proffers his own preferred explanation.
He argues that the Court has a long-term interest in reshaping the judiciary
of the Community to allow itself to act more like a high court of appeals of
Community law, with the courts and tribunals of the Member States, and 'any
administrative and other Community courts which might be established, acting
as courts of first instance'. This interest is said to outweigh the citizen's interest
in direct access to the Court. Three types of evidence are adduced by Rasmussen
to support his argument.
The first is that the Court has been equally restrictive under other, related
provisions of the Treaty, such as Articles 175 and 215. The difficulty of succeeding
under these articles is perceived to be part of the same judicial strategy whereby
the ECJ seeks to establish itself as an appellate court for the Community.
The second piece of evidence adduced by Rasmussen is the existence of a
Court memorandum from 1978, in which the ECJ sought to persuade the
Council of the need for changes in the ECJ's structure, through the introduction
of a Court of First Instance. The object was to relieve the ECJ itself of certain
cases, such as those concerning staff, and more generally to allow it to concentrate
on matters of law.
The third strand of the argument draws on the development of direct effect.
On this Rasmussen argues that if the restriction of citizen access to the Court
under Article 173 was not to be perceived as a denial of justice, by preventing
31 For general discussion see, A. Barav, 'Direct and Individual Concern: An Almost Insurmountable Barrier to
the Admissibility of Individual Appeal to the EEC Court' (1974) 11 CML Rev 191; J. Dinnage, 'Locus Standi
and Article 173 EEC' (1979) 4 EL Rev 15; R. M. Greaves, 'Locus Standi under Article 173 when Seeking
Annulment of a Regulation' (1986) 11 EL Rev 119; C. Harding, 'The Private Interest in Challenging Community
Action' (1980) 5 EL Rev 354; P. Stein and J. Vining, 'Citizen Access to Judicial Review of Administrative Action
in a Transnational and Federal Context' (1976) 70 Am J Comp Law 219.
32 See, eg, the discussion of certain of the theories by Rasmussen, below n 33.
33 H. Rasmussen, 'Why is Article 173 Interpreted against Private Plaintiffs?' (1980) 5 EL Rev 112, 122-7.
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individuals from challenging suspect Community norms, then a different route
had to be made available. This was to be found in Article 177. Individuals who
were barred from Article 173 had no choice but to use Article 177 instead, and
to seek to contest the legality of the Community norm by way of a reference
from their national courts. This suited the appellate objectives of the EQJ, since
it could function in a more appellate capacity under Article 177; the national
court could find the initial facts and execute the ruling given by the ECJ, reducing
the workload of the Community Court.
The thesis advanced by Rasmussen is interesting, and may well have played
some part in the approach of the Court. There are, however, two difficulties in
accepting it as the main motivating force behind the Court's jurisprudence.
First, as Harding has argued,34 it is hard to explain the early restrictive case
law as being based on a desire by the ECJ to assert itself as an appellate court.
This case law was developed in the 1960s at a time when the Court was not
faced with severe workload problems.
Secondly, although the ECJ may well have aspirations to become a 'federal
appellate court' for the Community, the contention that this is the prime reason
why it has 'closed down' Article 173, with the objective of forcing applicants to
proceed via Article 177 instead, is problematic for the following reason. The
ECJ clearly wishes to limit the range of applicants who can, in general, challenge
decisions or regulations within Article 173. However, under Article 177 references
can be made at the behest of a wide range of individuals who are affected by a
Community norm, even if the norm is substantively a true regulation. The
individual will, in such a case, base the claim on the fact that, for example, the
norm in question is contrary to a provision of the Treaty itself, which Treaty
article has direct effect and gives the applicant rights which can be utilized
through the national courts.35 The idea, then, that the ECJ intended to limit
Article 173, with the intent of forcing claims through Article 177, when it would
have very little control over the range of applicants using the latter article, or
the types of norm challenged thereby, is not wholly plausible. The 'causality' in
this area may well have been otherwise: the ECJ restricted Article 173 for reasons
to be considered below, and applicants who sought to challenge Community
norms were forced to do so through the mechanism of Article 177.
(b) Restrictive Access and the Language of the Treaty
A different explanation for the ECJ's case law in this area is that it is explicable
simply on the ground that the Treaty itself did not countenance any broader
grounds of challenge. This is the thesis propounded by Harding.36
It has perhaps been easy, amid the welter of technical and difficult discussion of 'direct
and individual concem' under Article 173(2), to lose sight of a relatively simple message
34 C. Harding, 'The Private Interest in Challenging Community Action' (1980) 5 EL Rev 354, 355.
35 See below, 528-30.
36 Above n34, 355.
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that is forcefuly sent out from some of the earlier instances of private challenge of the
legality of Community action: that Article 173(2) itself, taken together with Article
189, does not, and was probably never intended to hold out much hope to private
plaintiffs in the case of measures not actually addressed to them. From the Treaty, it
is unequivocally clear that true regulations cannot be challenged by individuals, that
there is a difference between regulations and decisions and that decisions not addressed
to the complainant can only be challenged by him if he has a special interest in the
matter-that is, he is directly and individually concerned.
The explanation for this stance adopted in the Treaty is said to be twofold.
One rationale was that it was felt to be inadvisable to allow individuals to
challenge true regulations, or decisions which were addressed to Member States.
The other was that Article 173 was deliberately couched in more restrictive
terms than Article 33 ECSC, on the ground that the EC Treaty gave wider
legislative competence to the Community institutions than did the ECSC Treaty.
On this view it is simply tendentious to contend that the ECJ has been
restrictive in its interpretation of standing, insofar as this is based on the
assumption that Article 173 should have been construed more liberally.
While it is true that the Treaty clearly imposes limits on the extent to
which individuals can contest the legality of matters under Article 173(2), the
explanation proffered by Harding is, none the less, contestable. It is, of course,
the case that the Treaty does not readily countenance challenges to decisions
which are addressed to others; and it is equally true that 'real' regulations are
not to be challengeable at all. However, it is equally the case that the Treaty
does contemplate some challenges in the former instance; and it is also within
the express intent of the Treaty that the EGJ should be able to determine whether
a regulation really is a regulation, as opposed to a decision. The crucial issue is,
therefore, not whether the Treaty imposes limits on standing, but whether the
interpretation of those limits is on the right lines, or whether it could be
considered to be overly restrictive, and if the latter, the policy reasons for this
degree of restriction. What is apparent from the tests, and their manner of
application, in the Plaumann type of case, and in the Calpak type of case, is that
it is virtually impossible for an individual to succeed in any case which does not
involve some completed set of past events. The judicial reasoning which is used
to reach such conclusions is, as seen above, open to criticism, even given the
language of Article 173(2) itself. Indeed, the conclusions which are reached may,
as the discussion of the abstract terminology test revealed, serve to undermine
the rationale for allowing this species of challenge at all. The idea that the Court's
jurisprudence in this area is simply an application of the intent of the Treaty,
and that this renders further evaluation of the policy issues underlying this case
law unnecessary, does not, therefore, suffice.
There is another facet of the species of argument considered within this section
which should also be addressed at this juncture. The nature of the argument is
as follows. In national legal systems it is not easy for individuals to challenge
legislative norms, and therefore we should not be surprised to find that such
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challenges are difficult to mount in Community law. The plausibility of this
thesis depends upon the manner in which we classify Community norms. It is
possible to contend that the Treaty itself is akin to a constitutional document,
and that regulations made thereunder are akin to primary legislation and hence
that they are difficult to challenge. It is, however, also possible to argue that this
characterization is imperfect, and that in reality the Community modes of making
further norms should be regarded as sui generis. At the very least it is evident
that many of the regulations which are made by the Community are more closely
analogous in nature and content to secondary legislative norms, to rules made
by the administration, or to administrative decisions than they are to primary
legislation. The availability of standing in national legal systems with respect to
such norms is, in many instances, more liberal than that which prevails in the
EC. It is, therefore, necessary to look further for the policy justification for the
Court's approach in this area.
(c) The Nature of the Subject Matter: Discretionary Determinations and
the CAP
An understanding of the Court's reluctance to allow standing to individuals in
the mainline cases may be best appreciated by focusing on the nature of the
subject matter involved. Hartley has correctly observed that the ECJ appears to
be more reluctant to afford standing where the norm which is contested is of a
discretionary nature.37 The reasons for this reluctance can be appreciated by
focusing more closely on the subject matter in such cases.
Virtually all the mainstream cases considered above concern challenges to
norms which have been made pursuant to the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP)." The type of substantive challenge made to these norms is, for example,
that there has been a breach of Article 40(3). This Article provides that the
common organization of agricultural markets shall be limited to pursuit of the
objectives contained in Article 39, and shall exclude discrimination between
producers or consumers within the Community. An allegation of a breach of
Article 40(3) may well, therefore, require the Court to consider whether Article
39 has itself been breached. Article 39 is the foundational provision of the CAP,
and is of a broad discretionary nature. This discretion is manifest in two
complementary ways.
On the one hand, the Article sets out a broad range of objectives which the
CAP is to advance, which are themselves set at a high level of generality. They
include the increase in agricultural productivity, with the object, inter alia, of
ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; the stabilization
of markets; assuring the availability of supplies; and reasonable prices for
consumers.
37 Above n 6, 354, 359.
38 For detailed consideration of the CAP see, J. A. Usher, LegalAspects of Agrculture in the European Community
(1988); F. Snyder, Law of the Common Agricultural Policy (1986), and New Directions in European Community Law
(1990), ch4; S. George, Politics and Policy in the European Community (2nd ed, 1991), ch8.
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On the other hand, it is apparent that these objectives can clash with each
other,39 and therefore that the Commission and Council when making particular
norms will have to make difficult discretionary choices. Whether the resultant
choices do discriminate between producers may be contentious, since it may be
arguable whether a particular norm is only placing one producer group on the
same footing as another, or whether it is advantaging one group at the expense
of another, and hence discriminating against the latter.4" As Wyatt and Dashwood
state:
41
Both the Council and the Commission enjoy wide discretionary powers in fulfilling
their functions under the common agricultural policy. The Court has stressed that the
Council must be recognised as having a discretionary power in this area which
corresponds to the political responsibilities which Articles 40 and 43 impose upon it.
In the case of both the Commission and the Council, this discretion extends to
assessment of the factual basis of the measures they adopt, as well as to the purpose
and scope of those measures. As the court declared in Ludwigshafener: 'It should be
remembered that, in determining their policy in this area, the competent Community
institutions enjoy wide discretionary powers regarding not only establishment of the
factual basis of their action, but also definition of the objectives to be pursued, within
the framework of the provisions of the Treaty, and the choice of the appropriate means
of action.'
It is not surprising that the regulations or decisions which result will not always
please all those concerned. The very nature of the choices which have to be
made pursuant to Articles 39, 40 and 43, will often mean that there are certain
winners and losers from any specific aspect of the regulatory process: certain
groups will be content with, for example, the aid or subsidies granted to them,
others will feel that they have been harshly treated; in other areas a particular
group may feel that the levy imposed upon it has been unduly harsh. Countless
claims of this kind are possible, given the plethora of regulations and decisions
made by the Community in the context of the CAP.
The ECJ, as is evident from the preceding quotation, does not wish to be
placed in a position whereby it is being constantly asked to second guess the
discretionary choices made by the other Community institutions. This would
swamp the Court with cases of this kind. It would also be inappropriate for the
Court simply to substitute its view on the 'correct' balance between the objectives
set out in Article 39 for that of the Commission and the Council. Given that
this is so, the ECJ has two techniques at its disposal to prevent it being placed
in this position.
One approach is to adopt a restrictive standard of review, whereby it will only
overturn choices reached by the original decision makers if there is some manifest
39 See, eg, Case 34/62, Germany v Commission [1963] ECR 131; Case 5/67, Beus v Hauptzollamt Munchen
[1968] ECR 83.
40 See, eg, Case 8/82, Wagner [1983] ECR 271; Case 283/83, Racke [1984] ECR 3791.
41 The Substantive Law of the EEC (2nd ed, 1987), 300-1. The decision referred to in the quotation is, Cases
197-200, 243, 245, 247/80, Ludwigshafener Walzmuhle Erling KG v Council [1981] ECR 3211.
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error. Challenges are possible on the basis that the norm is disproportionate, or
that it is discriminatory, but the Court will not lightly nullify the discretionary
choice which has been made. This approach is evident in the following extract
from Wyatt and Dashwood:42
The Court has held that where the Commission is charged with evaluation of a complex
economic situation, it enjoys a wide measure of discretion, and that in reviewing the
legality of such discretion, the Court must confine itself to examining whether it
contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the administration
has clearly exceeded the bounds of its discretion.
The technique of limiting the standard of review has been particularly evident
in the Court's jurisprudence under Article 177 of the Treaty in cases where
individuals have sought to challenge Community norms through preliminary
rulings. In these instances the Court cannot readily restrict access through
controlling standing criteria, and it has responded by articulating a limited
standard of review. This approach will be considered more fully below.
The other approach is to employ very strict tests of standing, as a mechanism
to limit the number of cases of this type that the Court hears pursuant to Article
173. The advantage of this second approach over the first is that it is far less
demanding upon the Court's time. The first technique of limited review still
requires the Court to hear the entire substance of the case, even if it is ultimately
held that the applicant has failed to show the required level of error to justify
nullifying the challenged norm. If the applicant is excluded at the standing level,
then an in-depth analysis of the substantive claim is obviated.
The very strict requirements for standing in the mainline cases may, therefore,
be explained to a significant degree by the desire of the Court not to become
enmeshed in large numbers of cases in which applicants seek to challenge the
way that the Commission and Council have exercised their discretion to make
policy choices pursuant to the CAP.
(d) The Nature of the Subject Matter: Quasi-Judicial Determinations
and the More Liberal Case Law
What explanation can then be proffered for the more liberal stance of the
EC, in the context of dumping, state aids and competition? Two features
of this case law serve to distinguish it from the mainline cases considered
above.
One feature is that the procedure in these areas does explicitly or implicitly
envisage a role for the individual complainant, who can alert the Commission
to the breach of the relevant area of Community law. Moreover, as is evident
from the cases on this topic, the complainant may then play a prominent
role in the assessment of whether the alleged breach has actually occurred.
42 Above n 18, 301. For a discussion of the way in which the Court limits the intensity of its review in such
instances, see below, 530-5.
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The nature of this assessment has been properly described as quasi-judicial.43
The other distinguishing feature relates to the substantive nature of the
subject matter in these cases. A common feature in the areas where the ECJ
has been more liberal is that the nature of the subject matter is such that
the interests of the Community can be stated more unequivocally. State aids
can be taken as an example. The provision of such aid is contrary to the
Community's interest, since it places the recipient firms at a competitive
advantage as compared to firms in other countries. The Court is, therefore,
likely to be receptive to an argument, such as that put in the COFAZ case,
that the Commission has been mistaken in thinking that the transgressing
state has corrected its past illegal behaviour. A similar point can be made
about dumping. The Community has a clear interest in ensuring that goods
from outside the Community are not sold therein at too low a price. The
Court is, therefore, once again likely to be willing to listen to an argument,
put forward in a case such as Timex, that the Commission has set the
dumping duty too low, with the consequence that firms within the Community
are still being harmed. This is particularly so when the applicant firm is well
placed to make an assessment of the pricing and cost issues which are
involved.44
The situation in these areas can be contrasted with that in the mainline
cases on the CAP. In the mainline cases the paradigm is one in which there
are conflicting claims within the Community. Discretionary choices will be
made, pursuant to Articles 39, 40 and 43, and it may not be possible to
satisfy all those affected by the choice on every occasion. For the reasons
stated above, the ECJ is reluctant to become engaged in an extensive process
of second guessing the precise nature of the discretionary choice made in a
particular instance.
The rationale for the more liberal approach in the Greens case must be
sought on yet other grounds. The most likely explanation is that the Court
wished to emphasize the fact that the Community was open to all shades of
political party, and in that sense representative of European opinion. It did
not wish to be seen supporting a regime in which those presently represented
within the Parliament could weight the financial system in their own favour.
To borrow from the language of Ely, the Court was willing to use its own
power to ensure that the democratic system was not used by the 'ins' to
exclude or prejudice the outs. a5
43 Hartley, above n 6, 354-9.
44 The rationale for allowing the firms on which the dumping duty is imposed to have standing is obviously
different. The explanation here is probably a combination of two connected ideas. The first is that while the
dumping duty must, as seen above, be imposed by regulation, it is in reality often closer to a decision addressed
to specific firms. The second is that the whole issue of the existence of dumping, and the calculation of the costing
and pricing factors, is very controversial. To allow the affected firms to contest the regulation may well, therefore,
be a political judgment on the part of the Court.
45 J. H. Ely, Democracy and Disnst" A Theory of.Judieial Review (1980).
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5 Article 177: Preliminary Rulings as a Mechanism for
Contesting the Legality of Community Measures
(a) The Rationale for Using Article 177
Article 177(1)(b) of the EC Treaty allows national courts to refer to the ECJ
questions concerning the 'validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions
of the Community'. This provision has assumed an increased importance for
private applicants in the light of the Court's narrow construction of the standing
criteria under Article 173. Often a reference under Article 177 is the only
mechanism by which such parties can contest the legality of Community norms.
How then do preliminary rulings function in this context, and what is the
relationship with more direct forms of attack under Article 173? Harding provides
a succinct summary of the reasons why individuals wish to use Article 177.46
It should perhaps be bome in mind at this point why a request for a ruling under
Article 177(b) is likely to take place in certain kinds of case rather than a direct action.
It is not for reasons of procedural advantage: the direct action will prove speedier and
is procedurally more favourable to the private party. But a direct claim may not be a
feasible course for a number of reasons. Firstly, the time limit (two months) may well
have passed before the alleged illegality or indeed the private party's wish or need to
litigate has become apparent. In the second place, the individual may lack locus standi:
he may not challenge true regulations or directives and may only attack decisions
disguised as regulations or addressed to other persons if directly and individually
concerned, which itself presents an insurmountable hurdle in many cases. There is,
finally, a related point. It would be misleading to picture the private plaintiff as a
disinterested legal watchdog, alert to identify as soon as may be any possibly illegal
Community activity. In practice, the individual's interest is likely to arise when his own
activities are affected by Community action-usually through the instrumentality of
Member State authorities and not necessarily very soon after the inception of the
Community measure. If the individual's interest is seen in this light, then Article
177(b) appears as an equally if not more natural avenue of review than Article 173.
Consequently, in a period of more intensive Community activity which is likely to
provoke enquiries into the legality of the action taken, it would not be surprising to
discover a sharp increase in the number of applications under Article 177(b).
(b) The Mechanism for Testing Community Legality via the National
Courts
How then does an individual who is unable to raise a matter directly under
Article 173 actually do so under Article 177? Who are the parties to the action
in the national court from which the reference to the ECJ is then made? The
46 'The Impact of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty on the Review of Community Action' (1981) 1 YEL 93, 96.
It should be noted as a qualification to the point being made by Harding that Article 177 actions are often given
a speedier hearing by the ECJ than are other actions. This does not, however, undermine the general point which
Harding makes, given that Article 177 actions will, in any event, have to proceed through national courts as well.
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answer is that this varies depending upon the fact situation which is in issue.
However, a common type of situation would be as follows. A regulation is made
pursuant to the Common Agricultural Policy which cannot be contested under
Article 173, either because the applicant lacks standing, or because he or she is
outside the time limit. Regulations of this nature will normally be applied at a
national level by a national intervention agency, which will be responsible for
collecting the appropriate levies, applying the rules concerning security deposits
and the like, which are demanded by the relevant Community norms. This
provides the factual setting for the Article 177 action. The national intervention
agency will apply the regulation passed by the Community institutions. This
may, for example, require in certain circumstances the forfeiture of a deposit
which has been given by a trader. The trader believes that this forfeiture, and
the regulation on which it is based, are contrary to Community law. The
allegation may be that there has been a breach of general principles of Community
law, such as proportionality or legitimate expectations; or the allegation may be
that there has been a breach of the Treaty itself, in the sense that the regulation
is in violation of the principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 40(3)
of the Treaty. If the security is forfeited the trader may then institute judicial
review proceedings in the national courts claiming that the regulation is invalid
for one of the reasons adumbrated above. It will then be for the national court
to decide whether to refer the matter to the ECJ under Article 177(b). In other
instances the matter may arise somewhat differently. Thus, if a regulation contains
a demand for a levy which the trader believes to be in breach of Community
law for one of the reasons set out above, then the trader's strategy might be to
resist payment, be sued by the national agency, and then raise the alleged
invalidity of the regulation on which the demand is based by way of defence.
Once again, it would then be for the national court to decide whether to refer
the matter to the ECJ.
Brief examples can be given of these strategies at work. In R v Intervention
Board, ex p Man (Sugar) Ltd47 Man, a sugar trader, submitted to the intervention
board a tender for the export of sugar to non-member countries. Security sums
had to be lodged. The relevant Community legislation provided that the export
licences had to be applied for by a certain time. Man was four hours late in his
application owing to internal staff difficulties. The security deposit was forfeited
by the intervention board. This was a sizeable sum-J1,670,370. Man, therefore,
brought judicial review proceedings in the national court and argued that the
forfeiture was disproportionate and hence that the relevant regulation was invalid.
This was referred to the ECJ, and the Court held that the particular article in
the regulation was invalid, in so far as it demanded forfeiture of the entire deposit
for late licence application. The ICC case" provides a further example of the
same type of situation. In that case the grant of certain Community aid was
47 Case 181/84, [1985] ECR 2889.
48 Case 66180, [1981] ECR 1191.
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made dependent on proof that the recipient of the aid had purchased a certain
quantity of skimmed-milk powder held by an intervention agency. Compliance
with this obligation was enforced by the deposit of a security which was forfeit
if the skimmed-milk was not in fact bought. The applicant received the aid,
deposited the security, but did not buy the milk, and hence the agency refused
to release the deposit. In an earlier case the ECJ had held that the regulation
was invalid, because the price at which the milk powder was to be bought was
disproportionately high. The applicant, therefore, took the view that the deposit
could not be forfeited, since it only served to ensure compliance with an obligation
which was itself invalid. The Italian court made a reference to the ECJ, asking
whether the judgment in the earlier case, holding the regulation to be invalid
was also of relevance in subsequent litigation involving the same issue, albeit
that it arose from a different national court. The response of the ECJ was to
hold that the national court could rely on the previous ruling on the issue.49
6 The Intensity of Review
Once the applicant has established standing, and has also overcome the other
hurdles such as time limits for the bringing of an action, he or she will still have
to show the existence of some reason for the act of the Community to be
annulled, or declared invalid. Four grounds are specified in Article 173 EC: lack
of competence; infringement of an essential procedural requirement; infringement
of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application; and misuse of power.
General analysis of these grounds of review can be found within established
works."0 The objective of the present discussion is to focus attention on the
standard or intensity of the review, and to link this with the preceding con-
sideration of standing.
Anyone familiar with public law systems will be aware that to focus on the
heads of review alone is to consider only half of the relevant enquiry. The
intensity of the judicial review is also of considerable importance in determining
the reality of judicial control over the administration. How far will the Court go
in reassessing decisions made by the Commission and Council? To what extent
will the Court be ready to accept determinations made by the institutions relating
to the balancing of competing aims within the Community's objectives, and will
the ECJ's attitude differ from one area to another?
Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty contains certain explicit dictates on the matter.
It provides that the Court may not examine the evaluation of the situation
resulting from economic facts or circumstances in the light of which the High
Authority made its decisions or recommendations, except where the High
Authority is alleged to have misused its powers or has manifestly failed to observe
the provisions of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application. Although
49 Difficult questions can arise concerning the precise nature of the norms which can be challenged through
Article 177. For consideration of this issue, see Hartley, above n6, 398-404.
So See, eg, Hartley, above n 6, ch 15.
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the Article only applies to the evaluation of economic facts, the Court has shown
a similar restraint in other instances where the Community institutions possess
particular expertise or knowledge."1
There is no provision in the EC Treaty which explicitly performs the same
function as Article 33 of the ECSC. However, the intensity of review has, not
surprisingly, also been an issue under the EC Treaty. Many of the cases in which
applicants seek to have Community acts annulled or declared illegal concern
determinations made pursuant to the Common Agricultural Policy. The question
of the intensity of the Court's review of the impugned Community act has arisen
at a number of different levels.
First, it has arisen in the context of a challenge to the very choice of objective
to be pursued, and the appropriate means by which this should be done. We
have already seen that the foundational provisions of the Treaty in this area,
Articles 39, 40 and 43, contain a number of objectives which are set out at a
relatively high level of generality.52 This necessitates the making of discretionary
choices by the Commission and the Council. In evaluating the chosen option
the Court has held that the competent Community institutions enjoy wide
discretionary power as to, inter alia, the definition of the objectives to be pursued
and the choice of the appropriate means of action. 3 A similar recognition of the
discretion of the Community institutions is to be found in the Balkan-Import-
Export case, in which the Court stated that54
... Article 39 of the EEC Treaty sets out various objectives of the common agricultural
policy. In pursuing these objectives, the Community Institutions must secure the
permanent harmonization made necessary by any conflict between these aims taken
individually and, where necessary, allow any one of them temporary priority in order
to satisfy the demands of the economic factors or conditions in view of which their
decisions are made.
The Biovilac case provides a further good illustration of the same themeY.5 In
that case the applicant argued that Community regulations on skimmed-milk
powder were illegal for a number of reasons, one of which was that they
disregarded the object of stabilizing markets set out in Article 39(1)(c). The
Court rejected the claim. It stated that even if the object of stabilizing markets
and that of ensuring a fair return to the agricultural community (enshrined in
Article 39(1)(b)) were only partially reconciled by the contested regulations, it
could not be said that these were illegal as being in breach of Article 39: the
legality of such measures could only be affected if they were manifestly unsuitable
for achieving the aim pursued. More recent case law of the Court has continued
51 Ibid 425-7.
52 See, above 524-6.
53 Cases 197-200, 243, 245, & 247/80, Ludwigschafener Walzmuhte Ering KG v Council and Commission [1981]
ECR 3211.
54 Case 5/73, Balkan-Import-Export GmbHv Hauptzollamt Berlin Packhof [1973] ECR 1091, 1112.
55 Case 59/83, SA Biovilac NVv European Economic Community [1984] ECR 4057.
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to stress the same theme. This is exemplified by Wuidart5 6 The case concerned
a challenge to certain regulations which imposed additional levies on milk. The
Member States were given alternative methods for implementing the levy, and
it was argued, inter alia, that the two methods could lead to discrimination
between producer groups which was contrary to Article 40(3). The Court
emphasized that the prohibition on discrimination contained in that article was
merely a specific enunciation of a more general principle of equality contained
in the Treaty. However, the Court also emphasized that in matters concerning
the CAP the 'Community legislature has a broad discretion which corresponds
to the political responsibilities imposed on it by Articles 40 and 43 of the
Treaty'.57
More specifically, where the Community legislature is obliged, in connection with the
adoption of rules, to assess their future effects, which cannot be accurately foreseen,
its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of
the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question.5"
A second, related context in which the intensity of review can arise concerns
the interpretation of regulations or decisions made pursuant to the CAP. These
may often contain terms which premise Community action on the basis that
there are 'serious disturbances' on the relevant market, or where 'economic
difficulties' could be caused by a certain change in prices, or currency values.
There is no doubt that, as a matter of principle, the Court could undertake an
extensive re-evaluation of the factual and legal issues, in order to determine
whether such circumstances exist, and that on occasion it has engaged in quite
close scrutiny of the data. 9 To adopt this approach on a broad scale would,
however, be time consuming; it would encourage applicants to ask the Court to
second guess evaluations made by the Community institutions; and it would
involve intensive review of measures which are often adopted under severe time
constraints, or in situations where there is an urgent need for measures to combat
a temporary problem in the market. The relevance of these factors for a less
intensive species of review is evident in the reasoning of Lord Mackenzie Stuart,
who considers the problems posed for the Community institutions and the Court
by the currency fluctuations of the 1970s.6 ° His Lordship points out that during
this period 'the Court has had to consider the actions of the Community
institutions taken, of necessity, at speed against a background of rapidly changing
pressures, when almost every aspect has been under fire from those whose
interests have been affected'.
What do these instances demonstrate? First, I think, that the Court has had and is
having to deal with a series of cases-I could extend the list many times without




59 See, eg, Cases 106 and 107/63, Toepfer [1965] ECR 405.60 Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The European Communities and the Rule of Law (1977), 91.
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difficulty-arising in circumstances not only never envisaged by the Treaty of Rome
but in circumstances running counter to one of its basic premises. Secondly, they show
that the Court appreciates that in moments of economic stress when contingency
measures have to be taken the Community authorities must be allowed some lee-way.
That with hindsight it may appear that the measures chosen were not necessarily the
best is not sufficient to annul what has been done. Even so, and this is the third and
most important point, 'the law' must be applied to protect the administered if, no
doubt with the best motives imaginable, the Council or Commission, as the case may
be, has failed to protect their legitimate interest ... 61
The predominant approach of the Court has, therefore, not been one of
complete substitution of judgment, or of a complete rehearing of issues of fact
or mixed fact and law. At least not within the context of cases arising from the
CAP, which accounts for many of the actions brought against the Community
under either Article 173 or Article 177.
Brief examples can be given of the ECJ's approach in this area. In the CNTA
case, considered above, the applicant complained of the withdrawal of monetary
compensatory amounts (inca's), and also contested the criteria on which such
sums should be given. Mca's can be given to compensate for certain exchange
rate movements, in circumstances where those movements might otherwise
disturb trade in agricultural products. The Court held that the Commission
possessed a large degree of discretion in determining whether alterations in
monetary values as a result of exchange rate movements might lead to such
disturbances in trade, and therefore, whether inca's were warranted. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court also held that the Commission could properly take
account of broader economic factors, and was not confined to considering only
monetary values.62 A similar approach can be perceived in the Deuka case.63 The
applicant sought, through Article 177, to test the legality of a particular regulation
under which premiums payable on wheat were modified. It was argued that this
was illegal, on the ground that the basic regulation on these matters only
permitted adjustments 'where the balance of the market in cereals is likely to be
disturbed'. The Court rejected the claim. It stated that the Commission had a
'significant freedom of evaluation' in deciding on both the existence of a
disturbance, and the method of dealing with it. The Court then stated:64
When examining the lawfulness of the exercise of such freedom, the courts cannot
substitute their own evaluation of the matter for that of the competent authority, but
must restrict themselves to examining whether the evaluation of the competent authority
contains a patent error or constitutes a misuse of power.
This approach was confirmed, albeit with some modification, in the Racke
61 Ibid 96.
62 Case 74/74, CNTA v Commission [1975] ECR 533.
63 Case 78174, Deuka, Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH, B. J. Stolp v Einfuhr-und Vorrassrelle fur Getride und Futtermittel
[1975] ECR 421.
64 Ibid 432. See also, Case 57/72, IWestzucker GmbH v Einfuhr-und Vorraustellefur Zucker [1973] ECR 321.
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case.65 Once again the case arose through Article 177. Once again the applicant
claimed that certain particular regulations, this time on monetary compensatory
amounts, were in violation of the more basic regulation governing the area. The
latter only permitted such inca's to be granted or charged where changes in the
exchange rates of currencies could bring about disturbances to trade in agri-
cultural products. The respective roles of the Commission and the Court were
clearly delineated by the ECJ: it was for the Commission to decide on the
existence of a risk of disturbance to trade, and in this evaluation of a complex
economic situation it possessed a wide discretion.66
In reviewing the legality of the exercise of such discretion, the Court must examine
whether it contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the
authority did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion.
The third context in which the question of the intensity of review can arise
concerns the application of principles such as legitimate expectations, pro-
portionality and non-discrimination. It is quite clear that these principles can be
used in the context of the CAP to strike down regulations or decisions.67 It is
also clear that the Court will not readily find that these principles have been
broken in the agricultural sphere, from which many of the cases concerned with
the legality of Community action arise. This is apparent from both the primary
and secondary literature. For example, in the Merkur case the applicant com-
plained that the Commission had failed to fix compensatory payments for certain
products in line with a basic regulation on this issue, and that this constituted
discrimination since others in a similar position had received such payments.
The Court rejected the claim. It was influenced by the fact that the basic
Community regulation was an emergency measure, and that the rules for its
implementation to particular product categories had to be devised within a very
short space of time. It then stated:68
Since the assessment which the Commission had to make was perforce an overall one,
the possibility that some of the decisions it made might subsequently appear to be
debatable on economic grounds or subject to modification would not in itself be
sufficient to prove the existence of a violation of the principle of non-discrimination,
once it was established that the considerations adopted by it were not manifestly
erroneous.
The same approach is evident in more recent case law of the ECJ. In Fedesa69
the applicants challenged a Council Directive which prohibited the use in
livestock farming of certain substances which had a hormonal action. The
challenge was based on a number of grounds, including breach of the principles
65 Case 98/78, Firma A. Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] ECR 69.
66 Ibid 81.
67 Wyatt and Dashwood, above n 41, 302-5.
68 Case 4372, Merkur GmbHv Commission [1973] ECR 1055, 1074.
69 Case C-331/88, R v The Minister for Agriulture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of State for Health, ex p
Fedesa [1990] ECRI-4023.
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of legal certainty, legitimate expectations and proportionality. The breach of the
first two of these principles was based on the argument that the banned substances
were not in fact harmful, and that the Council had not adduced objective
scientific evidence to substantiate their action. The Court responded by stating
that in the sphere of the CAP its role was limited to examining whether the
'measure in question is vitiated by a manifest error or misuse of powers, or
whether the authority in question has manifestly exceeded the limits of its
discretion'."0 It declined to engage in a detailed scrutiny of the evidence which
lay behind the challenged Directive. The same theme is echoed in its judgment
on proportionality. The reasoning of the ECJ on this issue serves to make clear
that the principle of proportionality can itself be applied more or less intensively.
The Court stressed that the Community institutions must pursue their policy
by the least onerous means, and that the disadvantages caused must not be
disproportionate to the aims of the measure. It then continued as follows:7
However, with regard to judicial review of compliance with those conditions it must
be stated that in matters concerning the common agricultural policy the Community
legislature has a discretionary power which corresponds to the political responsibilities
given to it by Articles 40 and 43 of the Treaty. Consequently, the legality of a measure
adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate
having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue.
Space precludes any detailed analysis of the application of these principles in
the agricultural sphere. However, the secondary literature further attests to the
difficulty of utilizing such principles successfully. Thus, Vajda comments that
the Court's reluctance to involve itself in economic policy considerations makes
it hesitant to question the Commission's exercise of discretion on the grounds
of proportionality, unless the contested charge was really disproportionate. 2
Sharpston is equally clear on the difficulties which face applicants who wish to
plead legitimate expectations. Relatively few such cases succeed in the agricultural
sphere, and the 'general rule appears to be that the European Court will usually
be prepared to back the Council and/or the Commission and to hold that they
are entitled to have a fairly wide margin of manoeuvre in market management,
even where the chosen scheme has been subjected to fairly heavy criticism'."
7 Conclusion
The preceding analysis has attempted to draw together three of the important
issues which arise in the context of the review of the legality of Community
action: the legal criteria which are employed to determine who has standing to
70 Ibid 4061.
71 Ibid 4063. See also, Case C-8189, ine=o Zardiv Consorzio agrario provindale di Ferara 11990] ECRI-2515,
2532-3.
72 C. Vajda, 'Some Aspects of Judicial Review within the Common Agricultural Policy-Part II' (1979) 4 EL
Rev 341, 347-8.
73 E. Sharpston, 'Legitimate Expectations and Economic Reality' (1990) 15 EL Rev 103, 108.
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contest such action; the policy reasons which have influenced the Court in this
respect; and the scope of review which is undertaken if the ECJ proceeds to the
substance of the case. These issues are interrelated and any general analysis of
this topic should be aware of these connections.
It has been seen that the legal criteria which have been employed to determine
the limits of standing in the mainline cases are restrictive, in the sense that it is
extremely difficult for applicants to pass the tests in either the Plaumann or
Calpak type of case under Article 173. Various policy explanations have been
advanced to explain this stance. It is, however, suggested that the nature of the
subject matter provides the best rationale for the Court's approach, and also
serves to distinguish the mainline cases from those in other areas, such as
dumping, competition and state aids, where the ECJ has been more willing to
proceed to the substance of the case. Applicants who wish to contest the legality
of decisions or regulations within the agricultural sphere have resorted to Article
177 actions. Because of the nature of the action under Article 177, a request
for a ruling made by the national court, the ECJ has not, with some limited
exceptions, been able to exclude such applicants on the grounds of standing or
reasoning analogous thereto. It has, however, made it patently clear that it will
not lightly overturn a Community agricultural norm, and the standard of
substantive review is limited in the manner discussed above. Thus, even if the
Court were to be more liberal in according standing under Article 173, it is
unlikely that many would succeed on the substance of the case, unless the ECJ
were also to alter the intensity of its substantive review.
The actual tests for standing in the mainline cases, and the manner in which
they have been applied, can certainly be criticized, as has been done above.
Having said that, there are clearly sound reasons for the Court not to be drawn
into a continual second guessing of the plethora of agricultural norms which
emerge continuously from the Commission and the Council. In order to avoid
this the Court has principally used strict standing criteria under Article 173, and
limited substantive review under Article 177. It might of course be contended
that the Court should be more liberal with respect to standing, and hear the
substance of the case, even if ultimately the claim fails because the applicant
cannot show the manifest error etc required as the test for substantive review.
The reason for continuing to utilize the standing hurdle is that it obviates the
need for any enquiry into the substance of the case, and thereby saves judicial
time and resources.74
In assessing this general approach by the Community Court it should be borne
in mind that it is common in other public law systems for the courts to be relatively
non-interventionist with respect to economic norms made by government or
governmental agencies. Whether this manifests itself in restrictive standing
74 See above, 525-6.
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criteria, or in limited substantive review, or both, may well vary from system to
system.
75
It is, of course, the case that differing considerations may well apply in other
areas, in which the Court may be more willing to grant standing and to engage
in more intensive review. The breadth of subject matter covered by Community
law renders this diversity of judicial approach highly likely. Any assessment of
Community law must always be evaluated against the backdrop of the substantive
issues involved before the Court. In this way a richer understanding can be
gained of the Court's decisions concerning review of legality, whether these relate
to procedural or substantive aspects of the topic.
75 This can be apparent in both constitutional and administrative law. Constitutional scrutiny of economic
norms tends to be less intensive than the scrutiny accorded to cases which involve more traditional civil liberties.
Having said that, it is of course still possible for commentators to differ as to the precise nature or extent of the
substantive scrutiny which they believe ought to be available in respect of economic regulation.
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